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THE INCORPORATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION AGREEMENTS INTO SOUTH 
AFRICAN DOMESTIC LAW 
Izelle du Plessis 
1 Introduction 
There are different opinions as to the process whereby double taxation agreements 
(DTAs) are incorporated into South African law. This contribution aims to discuss some 
of the existing opinions and to offer a further perspective on the matter. 
It is important to determine the method of incorporation of DTAs, as this may 
influence, inter alia, the persons entitled to rely on the DTA, the timing of such reliance 
and also whether domestic legislation promulgated subsequently to the DTA and which 
conflicts with the DTA, will apply in preference to the DTA (a so-called treaty 
override).1 Thus, examining the process of the incorporation of DTAs into South 
African law involves an investigation into the status of DTAs in terms of South African 
law. 
At the heart of the debate lies the interpretation of two provisions, namely section 231 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa2 (the Constitution) and section 108 
of the Income Tax Act3 and the interaction between the two. 
Section 231 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the 
responsibility of the national executive. 
(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been 
approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection 
(3). 
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive 
nature, or an agreement which does not require either ratification or 
accession, entered into by the national executive, binds the Republic 
                                        
  Izelle du Plessis. BCom (Law) (Stell); LLB (Stell); LLM (Taxation) (UCT); LLD (Stell). Senior 
Lecturer, University of Stellenbosch. E-mail: idup@sun.ac.za. 
1  Hattingh "Elimination of International Double Taxation" para 36.14. 
2  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
3  Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
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without approval by the National Assembly and the National Council of 
Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly and the Council within 
a reasonable time. 
(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is 
enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision 
of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the 
Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament. 
(5) The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding 
on the Republic when this Constitution took effect. 
Section 108 of the Income Tax Act provides that: 
(1) The National Executive may enter into an agreement with the 
government of any other country, whereby arrangements are made 
with such government with a view to the prevention, mitigation or 
discontinuance of the levying, under the laws of the Republic and of 
such other country, of tax in respect of the same income, profits or 
gains, or tax imposed in respect of the same donation, or to the 
rendering of reciprocal assistance in the administration of and the 
collection of taxes under the said laws of the Republic and of such other 
country. 
(2) As soon as may be after the approval by Parliament of any such 
agreement, as contemplated in section 231 of the Constitution, the 
arrangements thereby made shall be notified by publication in the 
Gazette and the arrangements so notified shall thereupon have effect 
as if enacted in this Act. 
In practice, DTAs entered into by South Africa are not regarded as agreements "of a 
technical, administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which does not require 
either ratification or accession".4 This practice seems to be correct, since the provisions 
of s 108(2) of the Income Tax Act, which envisages parliamentary approval, indicate 
that DTAs are not of the kind referred to in section 231(3) of the Constitution. Most 
authors therefore agree that South Africa is bound, on an international level, after a 
DTA has been approved by both houses of Parliament.5 
  
                                        
4  Section 231(3) of the Constitution; Olivier and Honiball International Tax 295; Hattingh 
"Elimination of International Double Taxation" para 36.14. 
5  Section 231(2) of the Constitution; Du Plessis South African Perspective on Some Critical Issues 
112; Du Plessis 2012 SA Merc LJ 32; Hattingh "Elimination of International Double Taxation" para 
36.14. 
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2 Are DTAs self-executing or not? 
The real debate centres on the question of whether a further step is required in order 
for the DTA to become part of South African domestic law. In terms of the 
Constitution,6 an international agreement (of which a DTA is an example) will become 
part of South African law only when it is enacted into law by national legislation. Thus, 
a second legislative step is required for the DTA to become part of domestic law.7 
However, the same section of the Constitution also deals with self-executing provisions 
of an international agreement. It provides that these provisions need not go through 
the second step (legislative enactment), but are law in South Africa once they have 
been approved by both houses of Parliament, unless the self-executing provision is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an act of Parliament.8 
One view holds that South Africa's DTAs are self-executing and therefore become law 
on approval of the DTA by Parliament in terms of section 231(2) of the Constitution. 
This view is based, inter alia, (a) on the opinion that self-executing provisions are, like 
their American counterparts, provisions that, standing alone, would be enforceable in 
court. It is then argued that the distributive provisions in DTAs are self-executing in 
this sense; (b) the point that South Africa's DTAs are not each enacted though 
separate legislation. In terms of this view, section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act cannot 
be regarded as proper enacting legislation, since the purpose of this provision is 
merely "of an administrative nature aimed to empower the tax administration to carry 
out treaty obligations in the context of the powers granted under the Income Tax 
Act".9 According to this view, a DTA is not inconsistent with the Income Tax Act and 
therefore the second step of legislative enactment is not required. In this regard, it is 
acknowledged that DTAs by their nature conflict with the provisions of the Income 
Tax Act, but that they may also be consistent with the Income Tax Act in the sense 
                                        
6  Section 231(4) of the Constitution. 
7  See the minority judgement of Ncgobo CJ in Glenister v President of the RSA 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) 
para 92. 
8  The question of whether a DTA "is inconsistent with the Constitution or an act of Parliament" (s 
231(4) of the Constitution) is not addressed here. The focus of this paragraph falls on the question 
of whether a DTA can be regarded as self-executing or not.  
9  Hattingh "Elimination of International Double Taxation" para 36.14. 
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that section 108 specifically envisages the conclusion of DTAs and that DTAs are 
therefore consistent with the aim of that section.10 
Another view holds that South Africa's DTAs are not self-executing and should 
therefore be enacted into law by national legislation. As regards the meaning of a self-
executing provision, it is accepted that this concept is controversial. Some authors 
argue that the incorporation of the concept of the self-executing provision in the 
Constitution is unfortunate and argue that, since there are no self-executing provisions 
per se in international agreements, the reference to self-executing provisions can be 
ignored.11 If one supports this argument, the conclusion necessarily entails that a DTA 
cannot be self-executing. One of the counter-arguments is, of course, that a concept 
used in the Constitution cannot simply be ignored and that a meaning should be 
attached to it in the context of South African law.12 
South African courts have also considered self-executing provisions in treaties, but 
these judicial decisions have grappled with the concept.13 Only one case, Goodwin v 
The Director-General, Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, has 
pronounced on the meaning of the concept of a self-executing provision, where the 
court, seemingly obiter, quoted with approval from an American textbook, as follows: 
A treaty can be described as self-executing if its provisions are automatically, without 
any formal or specific act of incorporation by state authorities, part of the law of the 
land and enforceable by municipal courts.14 
                                        
10  Hattingh "Elimination of International Double Taxation" para 36.14. 
11  Scholtz 2004 SAYIL 216. 
12  Dugard International Law 59. 
13  See, eg President of the RSA v Quagliani, and Two Similar Cases 2009 2 SA 466 CC; Quagliani v 
President of the RSA; Van Rooyen and Brown v The President of the RSA (T) unreported case 
number 959/04 of 18 April 2008; Goodwin v The Director-General, Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development (T) unreported case number 21142/08 of 23 June 2008; and Claassen 
v Minister of Justice and Development 2010 6 SA 399 WCC. 
14  Goodwin v The Director-General, Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (T) 
unreported case number 21142/08 of 23 June 2008 para 37. The court in Quagliani v President of 
the RSA; Van Rooyen and Brown v President of the RSA (T) unreported case number 959/04 of 
18 April 2008 never explicitly described the meaning of a self-executing provision (Ferreira and 
Scholtz 2009 CILSA 269). In President of the RSA v Quagliani, and Two Similar Cases 2009 2 SA 
466 CC the Constitutional Court specifically found it unnecessary to consider whether the 
agreement in question was self-executing. According to Botha the judgement therefore does not 
deal with the notion of self-executing provisions (Botha 2009 SAYIL 264). However, Ferreira and 
Scholtz are of the view that the court, by implication, found the agreement to be self-executing 
(Ferreira and Scholtz 2009 CILSA 271).  
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Dugard states that a treaty will be self-executing "only if the language of the treaty 
so indicates and existing municipal law, either common law, or statute, is adequate in 
the sense that it fails to place any obstacle in the way of treaty application".15 Ferreira 
and Scholtz prefer Dugard's approach, because it proposes that domestic law, and not 
the treaty, should be the starting point of the enquiry. They suggest that a South 
African court should first establish the extent to which domestic law permits the 
application of the provisions of the treaty and only subsequently decide whether the 
specific treaty should be declared to be self-executing.16 The position in the United 
States of America (which is the source of the above definition) differs from that in 
South Africa because in the United States of America all treaties are self-executing by 
nature. However, in exceptional circumstances, provisions in American treaties require 
enactment in legislation. Whether or not these circumstances arise is determined by 
domestic legislation.17 South Africa, on the other hand, clearly requires enactment into 
domestic law (the second step, described above) for a treaty to become binding on 
subjects of the state. The treaty itself can therefore not determine its self-executing 
status, since it is domestic law that determines its enforceability by subjects of the 
state.18 
If one assumes that the reference to self-executing provisions in the Constitution 
cannot be ignored, those provisions require interpretation in order to determine 
whether a DTA can be regarded as self-executing. Only the definition cited in Goodwin 
(quoted above) has been approved (obiter) by a South African court and it is submitted 
that this definition must therefore be used as the basis for attaching a meaning to the 
concept. However, as indicated above, the first inquiry should be whether domestic 
law allows for the application of the provisions of the treaty. The provisions of the 
treaty itself are only considered thereafter. Applying this interpretation to DTAs, one 
therefore has to determine whether domestic law, that is, the Income Tax Act (and 
                                        
15  Dugard International Law 57. 
16  Ferreira and Scholtz 2009 CILSA 269. Also see Swanepoel 2013 
http://www.litnet.co.za/Article/aantekening-die-plek-en-gesag-van-internasionale-reg-in-die-suid-
afrikaanse-plaaslike-reg- 71, who argues that if domestic law permits the application of the 
provisions of the treaty, it follows reasonably easily that the treaty should be regarded as self-
executing. 
17  Scholtz 2004 SAYIL 211. 
18  Section 231(4) of the Constitution; Ferreira and Scholtz 2009 CILSA 270. 
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not the relevant DTA), allows for the application of the provisions of the DTA. At least 
two reasons may be advanced why the Income Tax Act does not allow for the 
application of the DTA without a further legislative act. First, section 108(2) of the 
Income Tax Act requires that notification by publication in the Government Gazette 
takes place and only once this has happened, will the DTA become part of the Income 
Tax Act. The Income Tax Act therefore places an obstacle (to use Dugard's words), 
namely, publication in the Government Gazette, in the way of the application of a DTA. 
Second, the very nature of a DTA is that it conflicts with the Income Tax Act. The 
Income Tax Act imposes a liability to income tax and, if applicable, the DTA may 
provide relief from that liability. The DTA cannot, therefore, apply automatically. A 
further legislative step is needed to indicate the relationship between the DTA and the 
Income Tax Act. Section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act fulfils this function by stating 
that the DTA, when published in the Government Gazette, shall have effect as if 
enacted in the Act. 
3 Section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act 
As was argued above, if a DTA is not self-executing, it can only become part of 
domestic law if it is enacted into law by national legislation.19 
According to Dugard there are three methods by which treaties can be transformed 
into domestic law. First, the provisions of a treaty may be set out in an Act of 
Parliament. Second, the treaty may be included in an Act as a schedule thereto, or 
third, "an enabling Act of Parliament may give the executive the power to bring a 
treaty into effect in municipal law by means of proclamation or notice in the 
Government Gazette".20 In the case of DTAs, the first two methods mentioned by 
Dugard are not followed. It is submitted, however, that the third method is used 
through section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act. This sub-section, which provides that 
the DTA shall be notified by publication in the Government Gazette and the DTA shall 
thereupon have effect as if enacted in the Income Tax Act, enables the DTA to be 
                                        
19  Section 231(4) of the Constitution. 
20  Dugard International Law 55 cited with approval in the minority judgement of Ngcobo CJ in 
Glenister v President of the RSA 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 55. See also Commissioner for the South 
African Revenue Service v Van Kets 2012 3 SA 399 (WCC) para 18. 
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incorporated into South African domestic law by means of publication in the 
Government Gazette. 
Some support for this argument may be found in a number of recent decisions that 
touched on the matter. In Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Van 
Kets the Western Cape High Court considered the DTA between South Africa and 
Australia. It was held that 
... the [Income Tax Act] has chosen one of the three principal methods to 
transform treaties into municipal law; in this case an enabling Act of 
Parliament which gives the executive the power to bring a treaty into effect in 
municipal law by means of a proclamation or notice in the Government 
Gazette.21 
In Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, in examining the DTA between South Africa and Luxembourg, 
referred to section 108 of the Income Tax Act, calling it "enabling legislation".22 
Although the court did not address the point directly, it was arguably confirmed that 
section 108 serves as the national legislation that is required to domesticate the DTA 
entered into by the national executive and approved by Parliament.23 
The latest decision to consider the process of incorporating DTAs into South African 
law is Krok v The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service.24 Again, the 
DTA between South Africa and Australia (as well as a later Protocol entered into 
between the two states) was in issue. The court stated that the DTA and Protocol 
were concluded in terms of s 108(2) of the Income Tax Act read with s 231(4) of the 
Constitution. The court further stated: 
Thus, they became part of South African law as they were approved by the legislature 
under these provisions and duly gazetted.25  
                                        
21  Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Van Kets 2012 3 SA 399 (WCC) para 18. 
22  Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd 2012 3 All SA 15 (SCA) para 
15. 
23  Du Plessis South African Perspective on Some Critical Issues 117; Du Plessis 2012 SA Merc LJ 38. 
24  Krok v The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (SCA) unreported case numbers 
20230/2014 and 20232/2014 of 15 August 2015. 
25  Krok v The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (SCA) unreported case numbers 
20230/2014 and 20232/2014 of 15 August 2015 para 24. 
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Clearly, the court in Krok viewed publication in the Government Gazette as a 
requirement for the DTA to become "part of South African law". If the agreement had 
been self-executing, publication in the Government Gazette would have been 
unneccesary and it would have been part of South African domestic law automatically 
on approval by Parliament. By implication, the court in Krok therefore found that the 
DTA and Protocol are not self-executing. The only way in which the DTA could then 
become part of South African domestic law was by enactment into law via national 
legislation, such as section 108 of the Income Tax Act. 
4 Treaty override? 
Whether or not DTAs are regarded as self-executing, the status of a DTA26 in relation 
to the Income Tax Act still has to be determined. In other words, once the DTA forms 
part of South African domestic law, does it rank higher, lower or on a par with the 
Income Tax Act? This question is of particular importance in the case of a conflict 
between the Income Tax Act and the DTA. If provisions are inserted into the Income 
Tax Act after a DTA has been entered into and these provisions of the Income Tax Act 
conflict with South Africa's obligations in terms of the DTA, will the Income Tax Act 
"override" the DTA? Again, there are divergent views on the topic. 
One view holds that DTAs take precedence over the Income Tax Act. This view is 
based on the opinion that treaty obligations have the same force as the Constitution, 
that is, they occupy the highest possible level.27 According to this view, the DTA will, 
consequently, take precedence over the Income Tax Act and a court will apply the 
DTA in preference to the Income Tax Act. However, the Constitutional Court in 
Glenister stated that: 
It follows that the incorporation of an international agreement creates ordinary 
domestic statutory obligations. Incorporation by itself does not transform the rights 
and obligations in it into constitutional rights and obligations.28 
                                        
26  Assuming that it has been incorporated into South African domestic law. 
27  Hattingh "Elimination of International Double Taxation" para 36.14. 
28  Glenister v President of the RSA 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) para 181. 
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In the light of the Glenister judgement, the view that DTAs create rights and 
obligations on a par with the Constitution cannot be supported. 
In a previous contribution the present author examined South African case law on this 
point and reached the following conclusion: 
[I]t is submitted that three views may be distinguished: 
• The view expounded in AM Moolla, namely, that the treaty forms part of the relevant 
Act and, in the case of conflict between the general provisions of the relevant Act 
and particular provisions of the treaty, the Act must prevail. However, the treaty must 
be construed in such a way as to avoid any conflict between the Act and the terms 
of the treaty. In AM Moolla the Court found, on the facts, that the Act gave content 
to the expressions used in the treaty, with the result that no conflict arose between 
the Act and the treaty. 
• The Supreme Court of Appeal in Tradehold was of the view that a double taxation 
treaty modifies the domestic law and will apply in preference to the domestic law to 
the extent that there is any conflict. 
• In Glenister both the minority and the majority judgments indicated that ordinary 
domestic statutory obligations are created once a treaty is domesticated via 
legislation. The minority was of the view that if there is a conflict between a 
domesticated international agreement and other domestic legislation, the conflict 
must be resolved by the application of the principles of statutory interpretation and 
superseding legislation. The judgment in Van Kets seems to follow the minority 
judgment in Glenister to the extent that the Court in Van Kets found the provisions 
of a double taxation treaty to rank at least on a par with domestic law and that the 
provisions of the Act and the double taxation treaty should, therefore, be "reconciled 
and read as one coherent whole".29 
Although the present author expressed a preference for the view of the minority in 
Glenister and suggested the principles of interpretation that should be followed to 
resolve the conflict, it was acknowledged that in future courts would probably follow 
the view in Tradehold in relation to DTAs. 
Other academic contributions have expressed contrasting views. Marais30 opines that 
a DTA will prevail (although it is not guaranteed) over domestic law as a result of the 
domestic interpretation rules. He argues that although treaty override seems 
                                        
29  Du Plessis 2012 SA Merc LJ 40. Costa and Stack also acknowledge the conflict between the 
Tradehold and AM Moola decisions, but fail to mention the third alternative, namely the approach 
of the Constitutional Court in Glenister (Costa and Stack 2014 JEF 272). 
30  Marais 2014 BFIT 608. For this statement Marais relies on AM Moola Group Ltd v Commissioner 
for the South African Revenue Service 65 SATC 414. Yet this case does not support Marais's point, 
since the court found at para 15 that in the event of a conflict between the relevant act and a 
provision in the trade treaty (in that case), the relevant act must prevail. Marais makes no mention 
of Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd 2012 3 All SA 15 (SCA). 
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extremely unlikely, it should not be entirely discounted and that if a domestic provision 
is "so pertinent that a conciliatory interpretation is not possible", treaty override can 
take place.31 For this view he relies on section 232 of the Constitution, which provides 
that customary international law is law in South Africa unless it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament. Marais does not explain how section 232 of the 
Constitution makes treaty override possible. If Marais meant that a provision of the 
Income Tax Act could override a treaty because customary international law is law in 
South Africa only to the extent that it is consistent with the Income Tax Act (the 
relevant domestic law), the argument is easily dismissed. Since treaties (such as DTAs) 
are not customary international law, they cannot be law in South Africa in terms of 
section 232 of the Constitution. But perhaps Marais's argument could be along the 
following lines (although he does not express it in this way): if one assumes that article 
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention),32 which 
deals with the interpretation of treaties, is customary international law and therefore 
law in South Africa, South Africa's DTAs will have to be interpreted in accordance with 
that article.33 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention requires states to interpret DTAs in 
                                        
31  Marais 2014 BFIT 608. 
32  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). Art 31 reads as follows:  
 "General rule of interpretation  
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.  
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the 
text, including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of 
the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:  
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions;  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.  
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended." 
33  South Africa is not a party to the Vienna Convention. In Harksen v President of the RSA 2000 2 SA 
825 (CC) the Constitutional Court stated that the extent to which the Vienna Convention reflects 
customary international law is by no means settled. However, in Glenister v President of the RSA 
2011 3 SA 347 (CC) the Constitutional Court at para 187 and fn 43 relied on a 31(3)(b) of the 
Vienna Convention, adding weight to the view that the Vienna Convention forms part of South 
African law. See Du Plessis South African Perspective on Some Critical Issues 98 for a more detailed 
discussion of the views regarding the status of the Vienna Convention in South African law. 
However, in Krok v The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (SCA) unreported 
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such a way that double taxation is avoided.34 It may be argued that if the Income Tax 
Act imposes tax in a situation where exclusive taxing rights are awarded to the other 
state with which South Africa has entered into a DTA, the application of the relevant 
provisions of the Income Tax Act may be viewed as a form of double taxation.35 
Marais's argument might then be that this rule of interpretation (which is assumed to 
be customary international law) may not be applied in such a way, because its 
application is in conflict with the provisions of domestic legislation (the Income Tax 
Act). 
However, article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which obliges South Africa to interpret 
DTAs in a way that avoids double taxation, does not conflict with the provisions of the 
Income Tax Act. DTAs should therefore be interpreted in keeping with article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention (assuming it is customary international law). If the result of 
such an interpretation is that the Income Tax Act imposes tax in conflict with the DTA, 
it is submitted that the approach of the minority in Glenister should, ideally, be used 
to resolve the conflict, a point to which I shall return. 
Therefore, although Marais's conclusion that treaty override is possible in terms of the 
Constitution is correct,36 his reason cannot be supported. It is submitted that treaty 
override is possible because of the provisions of the Constitution and the way in which 
these provisions have been interpreted by the Constitutional Court, namely that 
ordinary domestic obligations are created when an international agreement is 
domesticated. It is further submitted that section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act, which 
provides that a gazetted DTA shall have effect as if enacted in the Income Tax Act, 
conforms to the Constitution in this regard. 
On the other hand, Costa and Stack37 contend that interpreting South African law as 
overriding DTAs would be unconstitutional. Yet they do not provide any reason for this 
                                        
case numbers 20230/2014 and 20232/2014 of 15 August 2015 para 27, the court stated that aa 
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention are customary international law and binding on South Africa.  
34  OECD Tax Treaty Override 9. 
35  Oguttu 2009 CILSA 111. 
36  In fact, that treaty override is possible was spelt out by Ncobo CJ in his minority judgement in 
Glenister v President of the RSA 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) paras 100-101. 
37  Costa and Stack 2014 JEF 274. 
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view. Instead, their arguments are based on an interpretation of section 108 of the 
Income Tax Act. They argue that it would not make sense to interpret section 108 of 
the Income Tax Act in such a way that taxation will not be eliminated in the case of 
conflict between the provisions of the Income Tax Act and a DTA. In their view, section 
108 would become meaningless if such an interpretation were to be followed.38 
However, it is submitted that it is not the interpretation of section 108 that is relevant, 
but rather the interpretation of the relevant section of the Income Tax Act that 
imposes the tax and the provisions of the DTA.39  
Costa and Stack furthermore argue that a conflict between the provisions of the 
Income Tax Act and those of a DTA results in an ambiguity to which the contra fiscum 
principle should be applied. They also argue that the principle that the same amount 
should not be taxed twice in the hands of the same person (the rule against "double 
taxation"), should apply. The result of these arguments is that DTAs should be given 
precedence over the provisions of the Income Tax Act.40 It is submitted that these 
arguments cannot be supported. A conflict between the provisions of the Income Tax 
Act and a DTA does not result in an ambiguity (to which the contra fiscum principle 
would apply). Rather, the principles dealing with conflicting provisions should be 
applied to such a situation.41 Furthermore, the rule against double taxation is not 
applicable in these circumstances, as it is not the Income Tax Act that imposes tax 
twice on the same taxpayer. The Income Tax Act imposes tax only once. Double 
taxation results from tax imposed by another state on the same income to which the 
Income Tax Act applies. The DTA provides relief from this double taxation under 
certain circumstances. Whether this relief is applicable, given the conflicting provisions 
                                        
38  Costa and Stack suggest throughout their contribution that the intention of the legislator must be 
sought when interpreting legislation (and, according to them, a DTA). Numerous court cases have 
moved away from this approach to a more purposive one. See eg Natal Joint Municipal Pension 
Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 SCA; Krok v The Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service (SCA) unreported case numbers 20230/2014 and 20232/2014 of 15 August 2015.  
39  As pointed out by Olivier and Honiball the wording of s 108(1) does imply that the aim of DTAs is 
to prevent double taxation (Olivier and Honiball International Tax 305). That the aim of DTAs is to 
avoid double taxation is, of course, common knowledge and should, as set out above, be taken 
into account when interpreting DTAs. 
40  Costa and Stack 2014 JEF 276. 
41  See Du Plessis 2012 SA Merc LJ 40 for the interpretation principles that will be involved in the case 
of a conflict between a DTA and the Income Tax Act. 
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of the Income Tax Act, is in issue. Consequently, there is no question of double 
taxation imposed by the Income Tax Act under these circumstances.42 
It is submitted that the status of DTAs in South Africa is determined by the 
Constitution. It is furthermore submitted that the Constitution allows for the possibility 
that South Africa's DTAs may be overridden by subsequent legislation (for example, 
by amendments to the Income Tax Act).43 Whether an override will take place in a 
specific case should, it is submitted, be determined by the application of the principles 
of statutory interpretation which apply in the case of conflict. Although these 
submissions find support in the minority judgement in Glenister, both the AM Moolla 
and the Tradehold decisions express contrary views (as set out above). It is hoped 
that the South African courts will provide clarity on this matter in due course. 
5 Conclusion 
It is important to determine the method by which DTAs are incorporated into South 
African law. For example, if DTAs are self-executing, taxpayers and the relevant 
revenue authorities will be able to rely on the relevant DTA as soon as it has been 
approved by both houses of Parliament and they would not have to wait for its 
enactment into law by national legislation. It is acknowledged that the meaning of the 
concept "self-executing provision" is problematic. However, it is submitted that the 
definition quoted in the Goodwin decision should be used as a basis to attach a 
meaning to the concept at this stage, but that the first enquiry should be whether the 
Income Tax Act allows the application of the DTA. Two reasons were advanced why 
this is not so. Consequently, DTAs cannot be regarded as self-executing. Rather, DTAs 
are incorporated into South African law through section 108(2) of the Income Tax Act. 
This sub-section empowers the executive to bring the DTA into effect by publication 
                                        
42  As stated above, the purposes of the DTA, namely to avoid double taxation, should be taken into 
account when interpreting the DTA. 
43  Should treaty override take place, South Africa will be in breach of its duties in terms of 
international law. It has also been observed that the South African government has not enacted 
legislation intended to override a DTA (Hattingh "Elimination of International Double Taxation" 
para 36.14). Since the South African Constitution does not exclude the possibility of a treaty 
override, the legislature should consider carefully whether or not to exercise this power (see OECD 
Tax Treaty Override para 17). 
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in the Government Gazette. Support for this argument may be found in the recent 
decisions in Van Kets, Krok and, arguably, Tradehold. 
There are different views regarding the status of DTAs in relation to the Income Tax 
Act. The courts have been inconsistent in their treatment of the matter, handing down 
conflicting decisions. It is submitted that the provisions of the Constitution should 
establish the status of South Africa's DTAs. Hence it is submitted that (a) South Africa's 
DTAs do not attain a status on the same level as the Constitution; (b) treaty override 
is possible in terms of the provisions of the Constitution; and (c) the preferred method 
of resolving a conflict between a DTA and subsequent provisions of the Income Tax 
Act is to follow the usual principles of statutory interpretation (although this was not 
the method suggested by the court in Tradehold). 
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